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LOGIC AND LAWS:
RELIEF FROM STATUTORY OBFUSCATION
Ever-expanding use of the legislative process in recent years has resulted
in a vast proliferation of statutes and regulations. The Public Acts of the
First United States Congress (1789-91) filled only 203 pages.' The Public
Acts of the Thirty-first Congress (1850-51) filled 227 pages, 2 those of the
Sixty-first Congress (1909-11) filled 1459 pages,3 and those of the Ninety-
first Congress (1969-71) filled 2938 pages.4 In addition, publication of new
and recently amended federal regulations contributed to a Federal Register
exceeding 45,000 pages in length in 1974. The growth of state statutory
materials parallels this trend.
Unfortunately, the technology of statutory expression has failed to keep
pace with the very technological changes which many of the statutes them-
selves regulate. With the increasing trend towards legislation as a means of
effecting fundamental social change and the increased number and com-
plexity of statutes,3 it is time to reassess tolerance of ambiguity and obscurity
in statutes. As the body of statutory material continues to grow, it is im-
portant to take steps to assure that general statutory policies, as well as
statutory details, are not obscured by the difficulty of communicating such
a large mass of information. This note will examine the potential of
normalization, a process whereby conditions and consequences in a statute
are arranged and related in an orderly manner, as a means for improving
the readability of statutes and relieving them of syntactic ambiguity.
1. SYNTACTIC AMBIGUITY
A. The Nature of Syntactic Ambiguity
There are at least three identifiable kinds of ambiguity. Semantic vague-
ness is the uncertainty which inheres in the flexible meanings of words.
Subject as it is to all the difficulties of language and meaning, semantic
vagueness is the source of much uncertainty and, consequently, of litigation.
However, such semantically vague terms as "reasonable," "undue," "ex-
cessive," "good faith," and "sufficient" grant to the tribunal interpreting
a statute a means of tempering otherwise harsh rules to achieve just re-
1 1 Stat. 1 et seq. (1789).
2 9 Stat. 421 et seq. (1850).
3 36 Stat. 1 et seq. (1909).
4 83 Stat. 1 et seq. (1969); 84 Stat. 1 et seq. (1970-71).
5 See Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, 14 J. LEGAL ED.
485, 486 (1962).
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sults.6 Vagueness of this nature is also one of the most important tools
available to the draftsman desiring to promulgate a general rule for the
adjudication of disputes best resolved on a case-by-case basis, 7 and no
system of justice could function without it.
Semantic ambiquity arises when words which give the reader choices
between clear alternatives in word meanings are employed.8 Although
conceptually distinct, iti practice semantic vagueness and semantic am-
biguity sometimes overlap.9 For example, in some contexts the statutory
use of the term "domestic animal" may be both semantically vague and
ambiguous. How domesticated must a formerly wild beast be in order to
qualify as a domestic animal? 10 A phrase may also be subject to semantic
6 For a typical example of the use of semantic vagueness, see United States v.
Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), where the court was faced with deciding
whether the novel Ulysses by James Joyce was an "obscene" book. Clearly, "ob-
scene" books are not readily identifiable. The degree of identifiability is a function
of the semantic vagueness of the words employed in a statute. The greater the
semantic vagueness, the greater the flexibility a court is given to interpret a statute.
7 See Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA. L.
REV. 23 (1956).
8 For an illustration of the complex statutory construction problems semantic
ambiguity can create, see Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198
(1949), where an employee of the respondent company lost the sight in his left eye
in an industrial accident. The employee had previously lost the use of his right eye
in a nonindustrial accident, and the controverted issue involved the applicability of
second-injury provisions under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970). The Court held that recourse to a stat-
utory definition of the word "disability" was inappropriate although the statute
specifically defined "disability" for purposes of the Act. The Court accepted the
broader common usage definition since strict adherence to the technical statutory
definition would have yielded results incompatible with the purposes of the statute.
A similar construction problem arises when it is unclear whether a word is to be
given its generic or specific meaning. In Milton v. Milton, 193 Miss. 563, 10 So. 2d
175 (1942), the court was asked to decide whether the words "my home place" used
in a will referred to the home owned by the testator upon execution of the will
or the one the testator owned and occupied at the time of his death.
9 Similarly, semantic ambiguity and syntactic ambiguity, which is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 12-15 infra, may also overlap. The first criminal to be
sentenced to death after Massachusetts changed the form of capital punishment
from hanging to electrocution argued that electrocution was "unusual" and there-
fore constitutionally impermissible. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
"the word 'unusual' must be construed with the word 'cruel' and cannot be
taken so broadly as to prohibit every humane improvement not previously known
in Massachusetts." Storti v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 549, 553 (1901). What
makes this interpretation so startling is the fact that the court was construing not
the United States Constitution, but the Massachusetts constitution, which prohibits
"cruel or unusual punishments" (emphasis added). In other words, "or" can mean
"and" in certain contexts.
10 This exact problem arose in Commonwealth v. Massini, 200 Pa. Super. 257, 188
A.2d 816 (1963), where the defendant was convicted of shooting his neighbor's cat
under a Pennsylvania statute which made it a misdemeanor to "wilfully and
maliciously kill, maim, or disfigure any domestic animal .... ." Although the
Statutory Construction Act specifically defined "domestic animal" as any "equine
animal, bovine animal, sheep, goat and pig," the court below thought it could
ignore the statutory definition because of the provision in § 33 of the Act that
"Words and phrases shall be construed ... according to their common and approved
usage; ...." The lower court, characterizing the problem as one of semantic vague-
ness, submitted to the jury the question of whether the cat had been a "domestic
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ambiguity where statutory definitions, common law definitions, dictionary
definitions, or common usage definitions vary."
The primary focus of this article, however, is on syntactic ambiguity.
This ambiguity arises from the way in which the meaning of a sentence is
influenced by the intended relationships between individual words and
phrases used in the sentence, as distinct from the way in which the meaning
of the sentence is influenced by the meaning of the individual words and
phrases. Syntactic ambiguity is latent in a large number of statutes. For
example, a statute which states "If A or B and C then D" could mean "If
(A or B) and C, then D" or "If A or (B and C) then D." The difference
might be fatal in the case of a statute which reads:
If a person kills another during the commission of a felony or
kills another by means of a firearm and such killing is with pre-
meditation, then such person shall be guilty of murder in the first
degree.
Two possible interpretations of the above statute are schematically illus-
trated in Figure 1. The armed robber who accidentally stabs and kills
a victim during a scuffle is a first-degree murderer under the second inter-
pretation but not under the first.
12
One need not resort to hypotheticals to produce examples of serious
syntactic ambiguities. The first sentence of section 315(a) of the Federal
Communications Act 13 states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he
shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
animal." The superior court recognized that "domestic animal" may be semantically
ambiguous, but that freedom to choose among alternative meanings was foreclosed
by the Statutory Construction Act definition and the express exemption of § 33. Ac-
cordingly, it reversed, holding that the cat was not a domestic animal, and the de-
fendant had therefore committed no crime.
11 In Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962), Judge Sobeloff
rejected the argument of the taxpayer that a $25,000 prize he won was nontaxable
by virtue of the "civic achievement" exception to the general rule taxing prizes
and awards in section 74(b) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In that case, a
brewery had placed a specially tagged rock fish in Chesapeake Bay, offering a sub-
stantial sum and attendant publicity to the lucky fisherman who caught it. The
taxpayer claimed that the feat was a "civic achievement." The court looked to
the dictionary definition of "civic" in deciding that the promotion of beer sales was
not a civic purpose.
12 Professor Layman E. Allen discusses a similar kind of problem with the
California Pimping Statute which states: "Any person who, knowing another person
is a prostitute, . . .solicits or receives compensation for soliciting for such person, is
guilty of pimping, a felony .. " CAL. PENAL CODE § 266h (West 1953), as amended,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 266h (West 1969). Is a man who had the requisite knowledge
and who solicited for a prostitute guilty of pimping? It depends. If the statute means
that anyone who [solicits for her] OR [receives compensation for soliciting for her]
is guilty of pimping, then he is guilty. But if it means that the crime of pimping is
committed by one who [solicits compensation for soliciting for her] OR [receives
compensation for soliciting for her], then the contrary result is reached. This pre-
cise issue was litigated in People v. Smith, 44 Cal. 2d 77, 279 P.2d 33 (1955). Allen,
Law, Logic and Learning, 31 HARV. L. RECORD, Oct. 6, 1960, at 10.
13 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That
such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the mate-
rial broadcast under the provisions of this section.
FIGURE 1
Expressed in a shorthand notation where letters refer to clauses in the
above text, the statute has the following form:
If A,B: Provided, That C.
There are at least three logically plausible alternative interpretations of
this sentence: 14
Alternative 1: (If A, then B) and C.
IF
A. any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
THEN
B. such licensee shall afford equal opportunities to all other such can-
didates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station,
14 The author is indebted to Layman E. Allen for this example.
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AND
C. such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
Alternative 2: If A, then (B and C).
IF
A. any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
THEN
B. such licensee shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candi-
dates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and
C. such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
Alternative 3: (If A, then B) if C, which is logically equivalent to: if (A and
C), then B.
IF
A. any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, and
C. such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section,
THEN
B. such licensee shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candi-
dates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.
In alternative 1, C is an unconditional result. Under this interpretation
the broadcaster is not compelled to permit any candidate to use his station,
but as soon as he allows the first he is compelled to give equal opportunities
to other candidates. Whether or not he allows candidates to use the station,
if he broadcasts material which falls under certain provisions of the Act,
he may not exercise censorship powers.
In the second alternative, the censorship provision C is a conditional
result, and is invoked only after the station owner has permitted at least
one qualified candidate to use the facilities. At any time prior to allowing
a candidate to broadcast, the licensee is not prohibited by the provisions
of this Act from censoring any broadcast.
The third alternative interpretation construes C as a condition precedent
to requiring the broadcaster to afford equal opportunity to other candidates.
If the licensee allows at least one qualified candidate to broadcast, and if
he has no power of censorship, only then is he required to grant other can-
didates the use of the station. The use of the word "shall" in the phrase
"such licensee shall have no power of censorship" does not preclude inter-
preting clause C as a condition since "shall" is also used in clause A, which
is clearly a condition.
Although the three alternative interpretations are not equally persuasive,
a case sufficiently strong to give rise to litigation can be made for each. It
should not be necessary to require a court decision to inform broadcasters
[VOL. 9:322
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whether the censorship prohibition is a condition, a conditional conse-
quence, or an unconditional consequence. 5
B. Sources of Syntactic Ambiguity
There are numerous sources of syntactic ambiguity in legislation, not all
of which appear unintentionally. The nature of the political process is such
that it demands continual policy compromises. Rather than expressing such
policy syntheses in strictly semantically vague or ambiguous forms and
allowing the courts to transform general legislative directives into specific
case-by-case adjudications, legislators occasionally fall prey to a false
sense of economy which results in syntactic ambiguity-each side hoping
that it will later be able to stretch the language in order to attain a desired
political objective.' 6 In such cases, the courts are saddled with the extra
burden of making policy decisions which should properly be left to ac-
countable elected representatives.'"
Syntactic ambiguity also arises from limitations of the prose form in
which statutes are typically written. Prose is essentially a linear thought
stream whereas statutes often express multiple relationships. While the use
of prose in statutory drafting need not be denigrated, the use of some tools
of mathematics and symbolic logic can add clarity to statutes by facilitating
the clear expression of multiple relationships.' 8
15 In Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253 N.Y. 382,
392, 171 N.E. 479, 482 (1930), Justice Cardozo aptly lamented: "The task of
judicial construction would be easier if statutes were invariably drafted with unity
of plan and precision of expression." He might also have added that the task would
not only be easier but in many cases completely unnecessary.
For a discussion of other syntactic ambiguities, see Ely, The Limits of Logic:
Syntactic Ambiguity in Article One of the U.S. Constitution, 63 MODERN USES OF
LOGIC IN LAW 117 (Sept. 1963); Miller, Two Examples of Syntactic Ambiguities in
International Agreements, 62 MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW 72 (June 1962); Stern,
Syntactic Ambiguity in Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 60 MODERN USES OF LOGIC
IN LAW 129 (Dec. 1960). Modern Uses of Logic in Law is the former name of the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval news-
letter. In 1966 it became the Jurimetrics Journal.
16 Perhaps it is unfair to impute such motives to all legislators. Edward Craft, a
former counsel to the United States House of Representatives and a principal
draftsman of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, has stated to the author that am-
biguity is sometimes recognized but left unresolved by draftsmen because they
lack the requisite authority to make policy decisions and are unable to obtain the
needed decisions before drafts are actually adopted into law.
17 At least one commentator finds it to be a reasonable conclusion that the in-
troduction of ambiguity into statutes is a deliberate delegation of authority from
the legislature to the judiciary. Miller, supra note 7, at 30.
18 Professor Allen states that the usefulness of modern symbolic logic is shown
in the following ways: It brings to light the precise issues faced in questions of law,
it permits these issues to be formulated in relatively precise and unambiguous terms,
and it marks the limits within which a situation is open for judicial choice and
discretion. Allen & Orechkoff, Toward a More Systematic Drafting and Interpreting
of the Internal Revenue Code: Expenses, Losses, and Bad Debts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 62 (1957). His last point is especially pertinent. Ill-formulated statutes can give
rise to policy questions disguised as technical construction questions and to equally
muddled answers by courts seeking to avoid the appearance of judicial legislation
by converting the issue to "simple" construction of a statute.
For a very spirited debate on the general utility of symbolic logic applications in
WINTER 1976]
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Tradition has been responsible for many drafting forms which render
statutes syntactically ambiguous. For example, although provisos are dis-
favored by modern draftsmen as unduly complex, their use persists in spite
of the obvious difficulty in defining the scope of the proviso. 19 The tendency
to borrow heavily from existing statutes in other jurisdictions exacerbates
the problem.
Oversight has also contributed significantly to the problem of syntactic
ambiguity. Most lawyers receive little or no formal training in symbolic
logic techniques.20 The intuitive skills possessed by most lawyers are ade-
quate most of the time, but there is a serious need for a more systematic
approach. In the late 1930's the Prudential Life Insurance Company was
using two sets of rules devised to take care of all possible cases of premium
schedule rearrangements by policyholders. A mathematician analyzed the
supposedly equivalent rules and demonstrated that in four possible situa-
tions the revised rules yielded different results. 21 This is not to say that the
insurance company lawyers, given enough time, could not have done the
same. Rather, it is to emphasize that there are techniques more efficient
than trial and error for analyzing and expressing relationships between
various sets of conditions and their associated consequences.
C. Costs of Syntactic Ambiguity
It is virtually impossible to quantify the total real costs to society result-
ing from syntactically ambiguous statutes. There are, however, several fairly
obvious identifiable costs. To the extent that courts are forced to repeat the
work of the legislature in deciding what a statute would have said had it
been clearly expressed, syntactic ambiguity represents a burden to society.
This burden manifests itself in the rising expense of legal services. Good
advocacy requires substantial research, and research time is frequently con-
sumed in studying ambiguous statutes and reviewing cases which clarify the
law (and one in which the last shots have probably not yet been fired), see Summers,
A Note on Symbolic Logic and the Law, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 486 (1961); Allen, Sym-
bolic Logic and the Law: A Reply, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 47 (1962); Tammelo, Syntactic
Ambiguity, Conceptual Vagueness, and the Lawyer's Hard Thinking, 15 J. LEGAL
ED. 56 (1962); Summers, Symbolic Logic and Law: A Reply to Professors Allen and
Tamnmelo, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 60 (1962).
19 In Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 181 (1888) the
Court stated:
The difficulty . . . arises from the doubt attached to the meaning of
the term "provided." The general purpose of a proviso, as is well
known, is to except the clause covered by it from the general pro-
visions of a statute, or from some provisions of it, or to qualify the
operation of the statute in some particular. But it is often used in other
senses. It is a common practice . . . to precede . . . proposed amend-
ments with the term "provided," so as to declare that, notwithstanding
existing provisions, the one thus expressed is to prevail, thus having
no greater significance than would be attached to the conjunction
"but" or "and" in the same place, and simply serving to separate or
distinguish the different paragraphs or sentences.
20 See generally Scott, A Plea for the Study of Logic, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 206 (1968).
21 Pfeiffer. Symnbolic Logic, SCIENTIFIc AM., Dec. 1950, at 22.
[VOL. 9:322
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ambiguities. 22 The mark of a well-drafted statute, contract, or will is that
it seldom reaches a court since all parties are able to agree on its interpre-
tation. Proper use of semantic vagueness allows unresolved questions to be
treated as policy issues for which proper recourse is had in the legislature
or through further negotiation.
The cost which is hardest to define, but which is perhaps the greatest, is
the loss of public respect for the law. Underlying this disrespect is often
resentment of legal jargon2 3 and a deep and abiding suspicion that the law
is deliberately placed beyond the reach of the public in order to promote
the financial interests of members of the bar.2 4 This article will describe a
method of expression which does not produce syntactic ambiguity and




There have been several attempts during the last quarter-century to
develop methods for clarifying statutes through syntactic manipulations.
One of the earliest was known as "systematic pulverization. ' 25 As the name
implies, this method involves breaking complex sentences into simpler state-
ments of legal conditions or consequences. If necessary, the statements are
reworded. Then they are recombined into an outline form using only six
logical connectives: conjuction (A & B), inclusive disjunction (A &OR B),
exclusive disjunction (A OR B), negation (NOT A), implication (A/B),
and coimplication (A//B). The final product is a syntactically unamiguous,
part-English, part-symbolic statement of the statute.
2 6
Systematic pulverization has been criticized by the proponents of the
22 The statistics describing the exponentially increasing numbers of statutes, reg-
ulations, and cases the modern lawyer has to deal with have been repeated enough
times to have lost their shock value. Cohen, Research Habits o1 Lawyers, 9 JURI-
METRICS J. 183 (June 1969) gives an enlightening empirical look at the consequences.
23 See Whereas . . . Legalese Is Vanishing from Some Contracts, The Nat'l Ob-
server, June 21, 1975, at 8, col. 5.
24 See Waltz, Some Thoughts on the Legal Profession's Public Image, 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 651 (1974).
25 Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833 (1957); Allen & Orechkoff, Toward a More Systematic
Drafting and Interpeting of the Internal Revenue Code: Expenses, Losses, and Bad
Debts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1957).
26 For example, the original text of INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 74 reads:
Prizes and Awards-
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section
117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income
includes amounts received as prizes and awards.
(b) Exception.-Gross income does not include amounts received as
prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious,
charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achieve-
ment, but only if-
(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter
the contest or proceeding; and
(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services
as a condition to receiving the prize or award.
WINTER 1976]
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more recent computer drafting method 27 as producing statutes which are
unduly confusing to the reader and lacking in fixed rules by which one can
reliably deduce the final form. 28 In the computer drafting method, a statute
is subjectively decomposed into propositions which are either input vari-
ables (conditions) or output functions (consequences). The analyst then
prepares a flowchart which, in effect, schematically illustrates a decision
tree. 29 Each node representing an input variable has two emanating paths-
After systematic pulverization, it reads:
1. Amounts are received as prizes &OR awards
2. 1. 1) that amount qualifies for exclusion in section 117 (relating
to scholarship and fellowship grants)










&2. there was NOT any action on the part of the se-
lected recipient to enter the contest &OR pro-
ceeding
&3. the recipient is NOT required to render substan-
tial future services as a condition to receiving the
prize &OR award
2. SUCH AMOUNTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN GROSS
INCOME.
Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833, 875 (1957).
27 Comment, A Computer Method for Legal Drafting Using Propositional Logic,
53 TEXAS L. REV. 965 (1975).
28 Id. at 979-80.
29 A decision tree is merely a generic name for any graph which has a single
starting point, a series of "nodes" which represent choices, and lines emanating from
the nodes which lead to further nodes or to terminal points (final outcomes). A
simple decision tree illustrating sentencing choices is shown below:
START
What kind of crime?
felony misdemeanor
the felony Upo0daya homicide? I imprisonment
or up to $100I
no /%yes fin
([other felony] rWhat degree
iag / 2nd%3rdL" 
555




one representing fulfillment of the stated condition and the other denoting
unfulfillment. Some paths may terminate at nodes which are output func-
tions; others may lead to further input variable nodes. From this flowchart,
the analyst ultimately constructs a truth table which represents all possible
combinations of fulfillment or unfulfillment of the various conditions. On
the basis of this truth table, a computer calculates a logical equation which
is the most compact product-of-sums or sum-of-products form30 using only
the five syntax words "if," "then," "and," "or," and "not."' When the text
of each input variable and output function is substituted for the correspond-
ing symbol, this equation forms the statute.
32
The computer drafting method is not entirely adequate for simplifying
complex statutory provisions in light of some "illogical" constraints posed
by our legal system. A simple hypothetical statute illustrates the point:
If a person is injured as a direct result of an explosion occurring
on the premises of a manufacturer of dynamite, gunpowder, or
other such material, whether or not such injured person was con-
tributorily negligent, then the manufacturer shall be liable.
Regardless of whether the phrase "whether or not such injured person
is contributorily negligent" is treated as a single basic proposition33 or as
30 The "product-of-sums" form is equivalent to a "conjunction-of-disjunctions,"
i.e., groups of ORs connected by ANDs. Similarly, the "sum-of-products" is equiv-
alent to a "disjunction-of-conjunctions," i.e., groups of ANDs connected by ORs.
31 Although similar, these are not exactly the same five syntax forms used in the
normalization method described in part II B, infra.
32 The following is the statute quoted in note 26 supra after application of the
computer drafting method:
IF-(1) The taxpayer receives prizes or awards, AND
(2) Section 117 (relating to scholarship and fellowship awards)
does NOT exclude such amounts as gross income, AND
(3) One of the following-
(a) The prizes or awards are NOT made primarily in recogni-
tion of religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic,
literary, or civic achievement, OR
(b) The recipient was NOT selected without any action on his
part to enter the contest or proceeding, OR
(c) The recipient is required to render substantial future serv-
ices as a condition to receiving the prize or award,
THEN-The taxpayer must include such amounts in gross income.
Comment, supra note 27, at 985-86.
33 In this case, the propositions are:
A. A person is injured as a direct result of an explosion occurring on the premises
of a manufacturer of dynamite, gunpowder, or other such material.
B. Such injured person was or was not contributorily negligent.
f,. The manufacturer shall be liable.
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two alternative propositions, 34 one arrives by this method at the same
simplified form:
IF- A person is injured as a direct result of an explosion
occurring on the premises of a manufacturer of dyna-
mite, gunpowder, or other such material,
THEN- The manufacturer shall be liable.
The resulting diagram and truth table then become:
START
jno









*These terms are included
although B will never
actually be false.
After undergoing simplification, the resulting expression is:
IF- A person is injured as a direct result of an explosion occurring on the
premises of a manufacturer of dynamite, gunpowder, or other such
material,
THEN-The manufacturer shall be liable.
34 The propositions are:
A. A person is injured as a direct result of an explosion occurring on the prem-
ises of a manufacturer of dynamite, gunpowder, or other such material.
B. Such injured person was contributorily negligent.
C. Such injured person was not contributorily negligent.
f,. The manufacturer shall be liable.




A B C /
F F F F
F F T F
F T F F
F T T F
T F F T
T F T T
T T F T
T T T T
/,=T 4-
1,=T
After simplification, the expression reduces to the same form as shown in note 33
supra.
no
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This happens because, according to the logical rules employed in the
computer drafting method, when a result occurs whether or not a condition
mentioned in the statute is fulfilled, the mention of the condition may be
omitted without substantively altering the statute. However, in a legal
sense, the words "whether or not such injured person is contributorily
negligent" serve a purpose. They are a legislative mandate forbidding a
court to imply unexpressed conditions. 35 If this prohibition were not in-
cluded, a court might invoke common law contributory negligence doctrine,
thereby thwarting the strict liability imposed by the statute.
There is an additional potential pitfall in the computer drafting method
that arises when certain legal norms or statements are formalized by means
of two-valued (i.e., true-false) logic. Consider the following sentence:
If there are six men and six women on the jury, then there are at
least twelve people on the jury.
Incorporating all of the restrictions imposed by the computer drafting
method, namely, that propositions chosen as input variables are indepen-
dent and represent relevant conditions of the world, and propositions
chosen as output functions are dependent and describe relevant conse-
quences of the input variables, the sentence can be said to have the follow-
ing logical form:
If (A and B), then C.
The component propositions are:
A. There are six men on the jury.
B. There are six women on the jury.
C. There are at least twelve people on the jury.
Under the rules used to simplify a logical expression in the computer draft-
ing method, this is equivalent 36 in two-valued logic to the expression:
(If A, then C) or (if B, then C).
35 All statutes have at least some unexpressed conditions, such as "If the person
is not an infant .... ," "Provided this statute is not unconstitutional . . ." or "Except
in the case of incompetent persons. .... "
36 Using standard two-valued'truth table notation, the two expressions are equiv-
alent for all possible truth values of A, B and C as is shown by the identity of the
columns at the far right.
A B C (A and B) If (A and B) then C
F F F F T
F F T F T
F T F F T
F T T F T
T F F F T
T F T F T
T T F T F
T T T T T
334 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 9:322
This expression asserts that either the first implication (If A, then C), or
the second implication (If B, then C), or both are true. Rewritten in English,
the original statement now reads:
If there are six men on the jury, then there are at least twelve
people on the jury, or if there are six women on the jury, then
there are at least twelve people on the jury.
It is clear, however, that a logical system which deduces the truth of this
latter statement from that of the former permits unsatisfactory results.
Using the rules implicit in the computer drafting scheme, a statement that
is clearly always true has been transformed into a statement that is not
always true. This example illustrates how computer drafting, used un-
critically, can actually affect meanings and produce erroneous "simplica-
tions."
37
It is not sufficient to assert that the simplification process in actual prac-
tice will avoid invalid results and produce only valid ones. If the reader of
a statute simplified by such a method cannot be sure he is reading what the
legislature asserted, and if it is necessary to check each example against the
original text for changed meanings, then the purpose of having the system
is largely undermined.
38
A B C If A then C If B thenC (IfAthenC)or (If B then C)
F F F T T T
F F T T T T
F T F T F T
F T T T T T
T F F F T T
T F T T T T
T T F F F F
T T T T T T
37 Another problem occurs because the computer drafting method lacks the "if
and only if" syntax construction. A statute of the form:
A, if and only if B
would have to be simplified to:
(If B, then A) and (if A, then B).
This requires that certain text be written twice in the final statute form. A statute
can rapidly become unwieldy if either clause A or clause B are themselves composed
of numerous conditions or consequences.
38 The normalization method described in the text produces a statute that appears
similar in some respects to a statute simplified by the computer drafting method.
It differs in at least two major respects, however. For the reasons just discussed,
the normalization method does not discard any condition. Even though the condi-
tion may not affect the logical outcome of the statute, it may have another legal
purpose. A normalized statute also includes an optional margin diagram in the final
statute form which schematically illustrates the syntax of the statute. Unlike the
computer drafting method flowchart, this diagram is ultimately for the convenience
and the benefit of the reader of the statute, not for the analyst who simplifies the
statute.
The primary goal of normalization is the orderly arrangement of the conditions
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B. The Normalization Method3 9
At the outset it is important to understand what statutory normalization
is not. It is not a method which will make our legal system obsolete. It is
not simply a way of turning lawyers into mathematicians. Nor is it
a panacea for all drafting and interpretation problems. Rather, statutory
normalization is a process by which formerly implicit cues in a statute are
made explicit, thereby permitting the reader to focus upon the fundamental
legal issues and policies underlying a statute rather than to flounder in the
mechanics of comprehension. This is accomplished by transforming a com-
plex legal norm embodying a number of conditions, which if fulfilled would
result in certain consequences, into a set of simple norms. Each simple
norm is a complete sentence and represents a statement of a particular
condition or consquence, or in some cases a set of minor conditions or






"if and only if ... then"
"not" or "it is not so that"
These syntax words replace all other connectives typically found in legal
drafting. The words "whenever," "unless," "in case .. . then," "upon,"
"when," "where," "where . . .then," "only if," "except when," "provided
that," and "provided further that" are replaced by "if . . . then," "if and
only if . . . then," or by combinations of these two forms in conjunction
and consequences of a statute to achieve maximum clarity and usefulness to the
reader. Although the two methods are different, they may be complementary. A
legislative proposal could be subjected to computer drafting in order to yield the
most compact representation of the explicit conditions and consequences, and to alert
the draftsman to the existence of extraneous conditions. Once simplified, normaliza-
tion could then be applied to the statute to produce a form that is most easily usable
by legislators, lawyers, and the public.
Another method, which is essentially the reverse of those already discussed, is
suggested in Cobb, The Use of Functions of Legislative Terms in Legal Writing, 64
MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW 1 (March 1964). In essence, this system takes a
logical expression of a statute and generates from that expression a multitude of
logical functions which correspond to true statements of the law when certain condi-
tions are fulfilled or unfulfilled.
39 This method for systematically restating statutory language in a syntactically
"clean" or normalized form was developed by Layman E. Allen. Allen & Ohta,
Better Organization of Legal Knowledge, 3 TOLEDO L. REV. 491 (1969).
40 Even the word "then" can be semantically ambiguous. For example, in the
sentence "The trustee shall then deposit such funds," the trustee may be obligated
as a consequence of some prior events to deposit the funds, but at no particular
time. Alternatively, the trustee may be required to deposit funds at a particular time
specified by the antecedent to which "then" refers. In the normalization scheme,
"then" is being employed in the former sense.
WINTER 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
with "it is not so that."'41 The word "but" and in some cases the phrase
"provided further that" are generally replaced by the word "and." The
connectives "and" and "or" are supplied in cases where their use is implied
but not made explicit. For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code contains the following provision:
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given. .... 42
Normalization makes the implicit disjunction in this provision explicit:
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer; or
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given....
Although it is not logically necessary to limit the language of normaliza-
tion to five syntax terms, there is a sound practical basis for this restriction.
By eliminating terms that can cause syntactic confusion, courts are more
likely to develop a stable consensus concerning the meanings of the syntax
words 43 and thus avoid unnecessary litigation solely over syntax.
44
The first step in the normalization process is the identification, isolation,
and labeling of all syntactic components, including syntax words, condi-
41 Words such as "when," "upon," and "whenever" are also used in many statutes
in dual senses to denote conditions which will lead to certain results or to denote
time relationships. Nothing in the normalization method precludes their use for
the latter purpose. They would, however, be replaced with "if ... then" or "if and
only if . . .then" constructions if used to denote conditions.
42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207(2).
43 See Goble, Terns for Restating the Law, 10 A.B.A.J. 58 (1924) where it is
stated that:
Theoretically it would seem that absolute accuracy in definition could
never be obtained, but practically it seems possible that diversity of
interpretation may be greatly minimized with respect to the meaning
of a few fundamental terms which must be used in any re-statement
of the law.
Id. at 58.
44The digest published by West Publishing Company entitled Words and Phrases
(perm. ed.) contains references to hundreds of cases which revolve around the
proper use of such syntax words as "and," "or," "if," "provided" and "then."
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tions, and consequences. These latter two elements often occur in the text
of a statute as complete sentences, but may also occur as clauses. The
application of these techniques to section 315(a) of the Federal Communi-
cations Act 45 produces the following result:
A If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified can-
didate for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
he shall af-
B ford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in
the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee
C shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under
the provisions of this section.
No obligation is imposed under this
D subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any
such candidate.
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candi-
date is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered
by the news documentary), or
E (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but
not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the
meaning of this subsection.
F Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be
construed as relieving broadcasters,
G in connection with the presenta-
tion of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events,
F (cont.) from the obligation imposed upon
them under this chapter to operate in the public interest
and to af-
H ford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views
on issues of public importance.
FIGURE 2 (Italics supplied to denote syntax words.)
Notice the difficulty of isolating constituent parts of clause E. Subparts
(1), (2), (3), and (4) are each separable preconditions, fulfillment of any
one of which will allow the operation of the last clause of sentence E; yet
they are not divisible in such a way as to retain the original text wording
4547 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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while becoming sentences. In such a case, small changes in wording may
be necessary in order to construct sentences. However, where such changes
are likely to introduce subtle shifts in meaning, it is better to treat the entire
clause, sentence, or aggregate of sentences as a single constituent sentence
in the normalized version. In order to facilitate the next step in normaliza-
tion, sentence E could be modified to read:
If a candidate is legally qualified and
(1) the candidate appears on any bona fide newscast, or
(2) the candidate appears on any bona fide news interview, or
(3) the candidate appears on any bona fide news documentary
(if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presenta-
tion of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary),
or
(4) the candidate appears in on-the-spot coverage of bona fide
news events (including but not limited to political conventions
and activities incidental thereto) ...
After identifying the syntax words, conditions, and consequences, it is
necessary to construct constituent sentences for each of the conditions and
consequences extracted from the original text. Converting syntactic cues
within sentences into syntactic cues between sentences enhances both the
clarity and readability of the restructured statute. Expressing each legal
norm in a separate and distinct sentence or group of sentences avoids forc-
ing the reader to mentally reconstruct a statement of a norm from its scat-
tered parts. Sentence F in Figure 2 is an example of this type of difficulty.
The use of constituent sentences is also important in the construction of a
legal information retrieval system based on statutory norms rather than
descriptive words, citations, or digest entries.
46
Several insignificant conditions or consequences may be treated within a
single constituent sentence if the aggregation would contribute to a more
readable statute. Clause G could be further broken apart, but this would
serve no useful purpose. In accordance with the cardinal principle of min-
imizing wording changes, the set of sentences resulting from one possible
transformation of the above-isolated components into constituent sentences
can be written:
A. Any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station.
B. He shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting station.
46 See part III C infra.
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C. Such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
D. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
El. A candidate is legally qualified.
E2. The candidate appears on any bona fide newscast.
E3. The candidate appears on any bona fide news interview.
E4. The candidate appears on any bona fide news documentary.
E5. The appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the
subject or subjects covered by the news documentary.
E6. The candidate appears in on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities
incidental thereto).
ET. It shall be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the mean-
ing of the subsection.
F. Nothing in the foregoing sentence (E) shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters from the obligation imposed upon them under this chap-
ter to operate in the public interest.
G. The broadcasting is in connection with the presentation of newscasts,
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of
news events.
H. Nothing in the foregoing sentence (E) shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters from the obligation imposed upon them under this chap-
ter to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.
FIGURE 3
The third and final step in constructing a normalized statute is to add the
syntactic relationships to the constituent sentences derived above. Where
the intended syntax is unclear, one may choose to mark a whole portion of
the statute as having alternative normalizations and later show the various
syntactic interpretations that can be derived from the given language. The
first alternative interpretation of section 315(a) derived earlier 47 is shown
in Figure 4.
47 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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4. it is not so that if
a/ 1 ...... El a candidate is legally qualified, and
2. a) .... E2 the candidate appears on any bona fide
newscast, or
b) .... E3 the candidate appears on any bona fide
news interview, or
c) 1. .E4 the candidate appears in a bona fide news
documentary, and
2. .E5 the appearance of the candidate is inci-
dental to the presentation of the subject or
subjects covered by the news documen-
tary, or
d) ... E6 the candidate appears in an on-the-sppt
coverage of bona fide news events (in-
cluding but not limited to political con-





b/ I ....... F
it 'shall be deemed to be use of a broad-
casting station within the meaning of this
subsection, and
........ G the broadcasting is in connection with the
presentation of newscasts, news inter-
views, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events,
nothing in the foregoing sentence (E) shall
be construed as relieving broadcasters
from the obligation imposed upon them
under this chapter to operate in the public
interest, and
2 ....... H nothing in the foregoing sentence (E) shall
be construed as relieving broadcasters
from the obligation imposed upon them
under this chapter to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflict-
ing views on issues of public importance.
FIGURE 4
a/ ........ A any licensee shall permit any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station,
such licensee shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all other such candidates for that
office in the use of such broadcasting sta-
tion, and
such licensee shall have no power of cen-
sorship over the material broadcast under
the provisions of this section, and
no obligation is imposed under this sub-
section upon any licensee to allow the use




Notice that syntactic cues are redundantly expressed in two different ways
in Figure 4. The margin diagram 48 and the text outline each convey the same
4 8 The text is not indented at various levels as shown in Allen, supra note 39, at
492. The author believes that clear separation of the text from the outline enhances
readability.












"Not," "it is not so that" no outline symbol
"If... then"
A
"If and only if ... then" "//"
B
In order to use the diagram in the normalized statute above, note that there are
five basic conjoined statements. In the case of sentences C and D, these statements
express unconditional results. The remaining three statements each consist of further
conditions which must be fulfilled for certain other consequences to follow. In its
* simplest form, the statute says:
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syntactic information in order to contribute to readability, clarity, and to
avoid syntactic confusion. The reader can quickly isolate the relevant con-
ditions and consequences that merit legal scrutiny. One of the primary
values of such an expression of the statute is that the reader spends far less
time on the mechanics of simply finding the appropriate place to apply close
legal analysis49 and, consequently can devote more time and effort to the
important task of deciding whether or not the statute is relevant at all, and
if so, whether the given facts of the problem fulfill the conditions expressed
by the language of the relevant parts of the statute.
III. APPLICATIONS OF NORMALIZATION
A. Interpretation
Some statutes, while not written in inherently ambiguous terms, are
nevertheless unclear. A portion of the recently repealed Michigan statute
setting forth the basic liability of a garnishee and the wage exemptions ap-
plicable to a garnishment in justice court50 appropriately illustrates this
premise. Although the statute can be deciphered with some diligence, its
application is not easily ascertainable even after several readings. The nor-
malized form in Figure 5 quickly makes clear the thrust of the statute.
One can quickly see from the normalized form that the first level of
classification depends on whether or not the garnishment summons issued
is the first in the case; the second depends on whether the defendant is a
householder having a family and the garnishment covers wages for personal
service; and the third (in the case of a householder with a family) depends
on the period for which the wages are being paid. The result of applying
these straightforward tests is the ascertainment of specific exemption figures.
It is not so that
if El and (E2 or E3 or (E4 and E5) or E6), then E7
and
If G, then (F and H).
49 See note 55 infra.
50 The statute formerly read:
When this is the first garnishment summons issued in the case and the
defendant is a householder having a family, nothing herein contained
shall be applicable to any indebtedness of such garnishee to the de-
fendant for the personal labor of such defendant, or his family, to the
amount of 60% of such indebtedness, but in no case when such labor
extends over a period of 1 week or less shall more than $50.00 of
such indebtedness be exempt from the operation of this chapter, and
in all cases at least $30.00 shall be so exempt. In no case where such
labor extends over a period greater than 1 week shall more than $90.00
of such indebtedness be exempt from the operation of this chapter, and
in all such cases at least $60.00 shall be so exempt. In case the de-
fendant is not a householder having a family, nothing hereinbefore
contained shall be applicable to any indebtedness of such garnishee to
the defendant for the personal labor of such defendant to the amount
of 40% of such indebtedness, but in no case shall more than $50.00 of
such indebtedness be exempt from the operation of this chapter, and
in all such cases at least $20.00 shall be so exempt.
P.A. 1961, No. 236, § 7511, effective Jan. 1, 1961; repealed by P.A. 1974, No. 297,



















a/ I ........... B
2 . .......... C
then




b/ 1 .... F
This is the first garnishment summons is-
sued in the case,
the defendant is a householder havinga
family, and
the indebtedness of such garnishee to the
defendant is for the personal labor of such
defendant, or his family,
nothing herein contained shall be appli-
cable to any indebtedness of such gar-
nishee to the amount of 60% of such
indebtedness, and
the labor extends over a period of I week
or less,
in no case shall more than $50.00 of such
indebtedness be exempt from the opera-
tion of this chapter, and.





b/ 1. . I
the labor extends over a period greater
than I week,
in no case shall more than $90.00 of such
indebtedness be exempt from the opera-
tion of this chapter, and
2.. J in all such cases at least $60.00 shall be
so exempt, and
2. if
a/ 1 .......... K the defendant is not a householder having
a family, and
2 .......... L the indebtedness of such garnishee to the
defendant is for the personal labor of such
defendant,
then
b/ I .......... M nothing hereinbefore contained shall be
applicable to any indebtedness of such
garnishee to the amount of 40% of such
indebtedness, and
2 .......... N in no case shall more than $50.00 of such
indebtedness be exempt from the opera-
tion of this chapter, and
3 .......... 0 in all such cases at least $20.00 shall be
so exempt.
FIGURE 5
Convoluted prose in the original text of the statute obscures the classifica-
tions by making some conditions applicable to all exemption amounts (e.g.,
"this is the first garnishment summons issued in the case"), and others pe-
culiar to specific exemption amounts (e.g., "such labor extends over a
period of 1 week or less") without apparent differentiation.
Adoption of normalizing techniques can reduce the occurrence of such
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elliptical drafting and pathological brevity as one finds in the last sentence
of the Internal Revenue Code provision defining "private foundation:" 51
(a) General Rule-For purposes of this title, the term "private
foundation" means a domestic or foreign organization described





For purposes of paragraph (3), an organization described in para-
graph (2) shall be deemed to include an organization described in
section 501(c)(4), (5), or (6) which would be described in para-
graph (2) if it were an organization described in section 501(c)
(3).
The normalized form of the last sentence maintains the same level of detail
that is used in the present statute, but incorporates the sentence into para-
graph (3), to which it solely applies.
52
A a/ 1 ......... A an organization is one which is described in
I section 501(c)(4), (5), or (6), and
B 2 ......... B it fits the criteria established in 501(c)(3),
I and
C 3 ......... C it does not normally fit the criteria estab-
tlished in paragraph (2),
then
D b/ .......... D for the purposes of this paragraph it shall
be deemed to be an organization described in
paragraph (2).
FIGURE 6
Normalization of the entire Internal Revenue Code would reduce the
need for the number of cross-references necessary in the "general rule...
limitations... exceptions.., modifications ... ." drafting technique pres-
ently employed. By adapting a statute to correspond more closely to the
legal practitioner's usual mode of thinking, normalization contributes to
clarity, minimizes inadvertent syntactic and semantic ambiguity, and
properly focuses attention on policy considerations involved in making
choices available due to a statute's semantic vagueness.
B. Drafting
Although normalization can be applied equally well to new legislative
proposals and to existing statutes, its ultimate value cannot be realized by
51 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 509(a).
52 The language is so obscure that this author is hesitant to assert that this is the
correct normalization. Whatever Congress meant, it could have been b2tter expressed
in normalized form.
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merely rewriting the latter and noting where ambiguities exist. High legal
service costs, litigation costs, and the indirect costs of public nonacceptance
can be reduced far more by employing normalization in the drafting process
itself. Normalization provides a formal tool to accomplish what draftsmen
have always attempted: the discovery and elimination of needless ambiguity
in the communication of legal policies. 53 Normalization compels the drafts-
men to select the intended syntactic interpretation during the drafting
process.
This technique will not stifle imaginative approaches to statutory drafting
since genuine statutory flexibility can be incorporated through use of
semantically vague "accordion" words which allow judicial discretion rather
than ambiguities in the syntax or the semantics. Indeed, the replacement of
all syntactic connectives with the standardized forms "and," "or," "if...
then," "if and only if ... then," and "it is not so that" should tend to in-
crease certainty in the law as standardized interpretations of their meanings
emerge and achieve consensus.
54
In the same manner that legislative assistants often prepare "plain
language" versions of complex bills for busy legislators, legal looseleaf serv-
ice publishers could prepare and distribute normalized versions of existing
statutes to practicing lawyers. Such a service, especially in the case of com-
plex or recently enacted statutes, would benefit attorneys dealing with un-
familiar areas of the law. Experimental results55 also indicate that nor-
malized statutes can be read and understood faster than non-normalized
statutes.
C. Information Retrieval
A body of normalized statutes lends itself readily to automated informa-
tion retrieval applications. Each portion of a statute can be indexed to its
possible alternative normalizations and to lists of cases which have sup-
53 An early proponent of the systematic elimination of semantic ambiguity made
an observation which is pertinent to problems of syntactic ambiguity:
[I]n any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal,
chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid
expression. . . the above mentioned inadequacy and ambiguity of
terms unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding paucity and
confusion as regards actual legal conceptions.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 29 (1913).
54 See note 43 supra.
55 In a yet-unpublished series of experiments conducted by Professor Layman E.
Allen over a period of nine years at the University of Michigan Law School, groups
of second and third-year students were given tests designed to measure compre-
hension of various sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Correct answers depended
on the ability to quickly find and apply relevant portions of the statutes rather than
the ability to analogize or to apply legal reasoning to semantic issues. Over the nine-
year span, students using normalized versions of the statutes required on the average
20 percent less time for a given interpretive task and achieved on the average 30
percent greater accuracy than control groups using the original text of the statutes.
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ported each interpretation.5 6 Such a retrieval hierarchy is not limited to
syntactic constructions of statutes. Cases which construe the words or the
policy of the statutory section, or which imply extraneous conditions, can
be related to or filed under the particular norm affected. Later judicial ex-
ceptions, limitations, and modifications of cases which have construed
norms can be shown as subnormalizations of a given norm or group of
norms. Unlike current systems in which the researcher is forced to follow
a trail of citations, gathering irrelevant as well as relevant details, this
scheme allows the researcher to start at the appropriate normalized section
and isolate the particular norms he is interested in pursuing in greater
depth. He may proceed directly to those cases which have reached a de-
sired interpretation as well as to those which yielded a contrary result.
D. Education
Normalization also holds promise as a new method of teaching statutory
material. While students can hone their analytical skills of distinction and
analogy with the case method, there is no corresponding framework in
which they can improve skills in analyzing statutes. One step in this direction
has been taken with the development of an interactive computer program
by Professor Layman E. Allen in conjunction with the University of Mich-
igan Law School Computer Facility. In this program, the student, given
only the list of constituent sentences, must attempt to reconstruct the full
normalized statute. The learner may ask a full range of syntactic questions
of the computer (e.g., "Is this sentence a result?" "Does the following result
occur when this list of conditions is fulfilled?" "Is this the complete set of
possible results?" "How closely does my hypothesis correspond to the actual
statute?"). In trying to construct a hypothetical statute which exactly cor-
responds to the real one, the learner can see graphically the results of impos-
ing stronger or weaker sets of conditions as a requirement of reaching a
given result. The student also can see the consequences of arranging the
conditions in various alternative ways. In so doing, the student must closely
examine the policy, the words, the semantics, and the syntax of the statute
he is constructing in order to successfully reconstruct the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
While normalization is not a panacea for all drafting ills, it is a practical
device for constructing more usable, readable, and unambiguous statutes.
It requires no extensive relearning of the law or current research techniques.
Rather, it is a system which strives to adapt statutory expression to the way
in which people actually use statutes.
The transition to a statutory normalization system might begin with the
introduction of normalized statutes for legal research use by commercial
legal publishers. Such material would be especially helpful to lawyers con-
56 AlIlen, Sketch of a Proposed Semiautomatic, Hierarchical, Open-Ended Storage
and Retrieval System for Statute-Oriented Legal Literature, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INT'L FEDERATION FOR DOCUMENTATION 189 (1965).
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fronted with a large new body of statutory material and to lawyers dealing
with an unfamiliar area of the law.
Tradition may prove a formidable obstacle to the adoption of any new
drafting form. However, without the optional diagram which merely serves
to clarify relationships between conditions and results, normalized statutes
look much like most modem legislation. The normalization outline is cer-
tainly no more complex than the tax code outlines,57 and the former serves
a real informational purpose rather than merely separating major topics
and numbering paragraphs for reference.
Tradition prevented lawyers from replacing quills with steel-tipped pens
until around 1860.58 Tradition kept rubber bands out of law offices until
as late as 1870.59 Tradition was even the source of lawyers' great reluctance
to adopt telephones and typewriters. 60 Tradition should not be allowed to
inhibit the introduction of drafting procedures with the potential to make
the law more understandable, and ultimately more just.
-Rudy Engholm
57 Section 170 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1970), relating
to charitable contributions and gifts, has 132 numbered and lettered subdivisions,
some of which are four outline levels deep. Section 170 itself is part of Title 26,
Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part 6.
58 Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, J. LEGAL ED. 485,
487 (1962).
59 Id.
60 Id.
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